Mona  Fiorentini v. William Penn School District by unknown
2016 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
12-16-2016 
Mona Fiorentini v. William Penn School District 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2016 
Recommended Citation 
"Mona Fiorentini v. William Penn School District" (2016). 2016 Decisions. 1093. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2016/1093 
This December is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2016 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 







        Appellant 
v. 
 
WILLIAM PENN SCHOOL DISTRICT 
______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civ. No. 2-13-cv-03689) 
Honorable J. William Ditter, Jr., District Judge 
______________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
December 9, 2016 
 
BEFORE:  FISHER, KRAUSE, and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges 
 






GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
____________________ 
*This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 







I.  INTRODUCTION 
 Plaintiff Mona Fiorentini appeals from the District Court’s order granting 
summary judgment to defendant William Penn School District on her claims under the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), Family and Medical Leave Act 
(“FMLA”), Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), and Pennsylvania Human 
Relations Act (“PHRA”).  Fiorentini asserts that she faced discriminatory adverse 
employment actions by the School District after she was diagnosed with breast cancer 
and subsequently took medical leaves and a sabbatical from her employment with the 
School District. 
 For the reasons that follow, we hold that the District Court properly granted 
summary judgment to the School District by order entered on February 10, 2016, and 
therefore we will affirm that order. 
 
II.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
A.  Factual History 
 The School District hired Fiorentini as a literacy coach and reading specialist in 
2001 to work at the Park Lane Elementary School.  This position entailed working 
primarily with teachers and other staff by providing instructional support.  Though 
Fiorentini was certified as a reading specialist she did not possess a Pennsylvania 
elementary teaching certificate during her employment with the School District.  Park 
Lane’s principal, Dujana Ambrose, supervised Fiorentini from 2006 to 2010, and 
Ambrose and Fiorentini, at least at the outset, seemed to have had an amicable 
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relationship inasmuch as Fiorentini testified that she had no issues with Ambrose prior to 
September 2009. 
 Beginning in 2009, the School District experienced ongoing issues with funding.  
As a result, the teachers’ union at Park Lane met with its members several times to 
discuss the possibility of layoffs.  In the spring of 2009, an officer of the teachers’ union 
met with Fiorentini to discuss the possibility that she might be laid off because she was 
not certified as a teacher in Pennsylvania and only had a reading specialist certification. 
 In September 2009, Fiorentini informed Ambrose of her need to have a biopsy to 
test for breast cancer.  Fiorentini testified that after she shared this information with 
Ambrose, she was treated as if she was a “leper” because she was prevented from making 
a presentation at a staff meeting, was accused of using incorrect preparation materials for 
her writing program, was kept from attending certain meetings, and was prevented from 
meeting with Ambrose.  She also testified that Ambrose yelled at her about impending 
deadlines when she told Ambrose that she needed time off for the biopsy.   
 Fiorentini was diagnosed with breast cancer in the fall of 2009.  Sometime after 
Fiorentini informed Ambrose of this diagnosis, Ambrose told Fiorentini that the 
description of her position would be changed.1  Fiorentini maintains that her job was 
changed from exclusively functioning as a literacy coach to being a literacy 
                                              
1  There is a dispute as to when Ambrose changed Fiorentini’s job description — 
Fiorentini seems to maintain that it occurred within two weeks of her biopsy, while 




coach/reading specialist.2  Her responsibilities also changed from working with 
kindergarten through sixth grade classes to working with third through sixth grade 
classes.  Ambrose testified that she had reassigned all nonclassroom teachers to new 
responsibilities at the same time as Fiorentini in order to support students in testing 
grades — including the third through sixth grade students — for upcoming state 
standardized tests.  Ambrose maintains that she followed this protocol every year.  
Ambrose assigned an employee ten years younger than Fiorentini to work with the non-
testing grades, kindergarten through second grade.  But Fiorentini’s salary and her job 
title in her personnel record were not changed as a result of her reassignment. 
 Fiorentini viewed her new position as a “demotion” because she maintains that a 
literacy coach/reading specialist position required fewer qualifications than a literacy 
coach position and she was working with fewer students than previously.  Fiorentini also 
testified that Ambrose told her that she was being reassigned due to her health, although 
Ambrose denies that allegation. 
 After Fiorentini received her breast cancer diagnosis, she required surgery and 
time off to recover at home.  The School District approved a series of medical leaves and 
a sabbatical for Fiorentini beginning in February 2010 through April 2011.  In June 2010, 
while Fiorentini was on her sabbatical, the School District underwent a reorganization 
under which all reading specialist and literacy coach positions were scheduled to be cut 
due to funding issues.  The School District created an instructional specialist position in 
                                              
2  There is an inconsistency in the record between Fiorentini’s initial job title in 2001 and 
the change in her job title in the 2009-10 school years, but this distinction does not 
impact our analysis. 
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an attempt to place some employees who were affected by the reorganization into new 
positions.  Fiorentini testified that she did not apply for this position because she was told 
that she was not qualified for it.  All new hires for the instructional specialist position had 
Pennsylvania teaching certificates and ranged in age from 38 to 66 years.  Fiorentini was 
57 years old at the time. 
 On November 9, 2010, Fiorentini received a letter from the School District 
informing her that her employment would be suspended at the end of her medical 
sabbatical period.  The letter explained that all of the available positions after the 
restructuring required prior teaching experience under a Pennsylvania teaching 
certification and Fiorentini did not have this requisite experience.  Fiorentini challenged 
the suspension by informing the School District that she had worked in a private school 
for a year, but she was told that this experience would not count toward a position with 
the School District because it was not conducted under a Pennsylvania teaching 
certification.  Nonetheless, after Fiorentini filed a grievance, the School District decided 
not to furlough Fiorentini in February 2011 and, instead, decided to reevaluate the 
situation once Fiorentini was cleared to return from her medical sabbatical. 
 In May 2011, Fiorentini returned to work for the School District at a different 
school as an instructional specialist.  However, after the completion of that school year, 
the School District again reorganized and eliminated the instructional specialist position.  
It, however, created a school facilitator position, which required a Pennsylvania teaching 
certificate as well as several years of teaching experience.  The candidates eventually 
hired for this position were 38 to 66 years old.  In August 2011, Fiorentini’s furlough 
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with the School District was confirmed because her reading specialist certification was 
insufficient for any available position. 
B.  Procedural History 
 Fiorentini sued the School District claiming violations of the ADEA, FMLA, 
ADA, and PHRA.3  The School District moved for summary judgment on all of 
Fiorentini’s claims and the District Court granted this motion in a comprehensive opinion 
and order entered February 10, 2016.  In granting summary judgment on Fiorentini’s 
ADEA claim, the Court found that the only action of the School District that constituted 
an adverse employment action was its furlough of Fiorentini in 2011 but that the School 
District did not take this action in circumstances giving rise to an inference that it took 
the action because it was engaging in unlawful discrimination.  The Court also found that 
Fiorentini could not show that the School District’s legitimate non-discriminatory reason 
for the furlough was a pretext for age discrimination. 
 In granting summary judgment for the School District on Fiorentini’s FMLA 
retaliation claim based on her reassignment, the Court noted that she was reassigned 
before she invoked the FMLA and took medical leave.  However, when the Court 
ultimately granted summary judgment it did so on the ground that it already had found 
                                              
3 Fiorentini does not rely on the PHRA on appeal but this circumstance does not matter 
because the PHRA claims are evaluated under the same standards as her ADEA and 
ADA claims and inasmuch as her federal law claims fail so must her state law claims.  
See Glanzman v. Metro. Mgmt. Corp., 391 F.3d 506, 509 n.2 (3d Cir. 2004); Buskirk v. 




that the reassignment was not an adverse employment action.4 
 Finally, the Court granted summary judgment for the School District on 
Fiorentini’s ADA claim because it found that she was not a “qualified individual” for 
work with the District when she was furloughed and because she did not present evidence 
that her medical condition was a “determinative factor” in the decision to furlough her. 
 
III.  STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367.  We 
have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 because the District Court’s February 10, 
2016 order constituted a final order. 
 We exercise plenary review over a district court’s grant of summary judgment.  
Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 265 (3d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 
S.Ct. 1738 (2015).  Therefore, our standard of review is identical to that of the District 
Court.  See Santini v. Fuentes, 795 F.3d 410, 416 (3d Cir. 2015).  Under this standard, we 
“grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any 
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56(a).  There is a genuine dispute of material fact if the evidence is sufficient for a 
reasonable factfinder to return a verdict for the nonmoving party.  Anderson v. Liberty 
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510 (1986).  However, a mere “scintilla 
of evidence” does not create a genuine issue of fact.  Id. at 252, 106 S.Ct. at 2512.  “The 
                                              
4  The District Court also granted summary judgment for the School District on 




non-movant may not rest on speculation and conjecture in opposing a motion for 
summary judgment.”  Ramara, Inc. v. Westfield Ins. Co., 814 F.3d 660, 666 (3d Cir. 
2016) (citation omitted). 
 
IV.  DISCUSSION 
A.  ADEA 
 To state a claim for age discrimination under the ADEA, a plaintiff must show that 
she (1) is 40 years of age or older; (2) was qualified for the position in question; (3) was 
subject to an adverse employment action despite being qualified; and (4) was subject to 
the adverse action under circumstances that raise an inference of discrimination.  The 
inference may be drawn from a demonstration that similarly situated employees outside 
of the protected class were not similarly treated.  Sarullo v. U.S. Postal Serv., 352 F.3d 
789, 797-98 (3d Cir. 2003).  If a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of age 
discrimination, the burden shifts to the employer to show that it had a legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.  McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. 
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824-25 (1973).  If the employer meets this 
burden, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the employer’s proffered 
reason for the decision is pretextual.  Id.  A plaintiff must prove that age was the “but-
for” cause of the employer’s adverse decision to prevail on an age discrimination claim.  
Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 177-78, 129 S.Ct. 2343, 2351 (2009). 
Fiorentini argues that the District Court erred in granting summary judgment on 
her ADEA claim because she established a prima facie case of age discrimination and 
9 
 
produced sufficient evidence of pretext.  The District Court found that of her claims only 
her furlough could be construed as an adverse employment action and that because the 
furlough did not occur in circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination, 
Fiorentini failed to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination. 
 1.  Prima Facie Case: Adverse Employment Action 
 Fiorentini maintains that she suffered two adverse employment actions: first, that 
she was reassigned to working with the testing grades after her cancer diagnosis and 
second, that she was furloughed.  The School District argues that her reassignment did 
not constitute an adverse employment action but does not contest that the furlough was an 
adverse action. 
 “[A]n adverse employment action is one which is serious and tangible enough to 
alter an employee’s compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.” 
Cardenas v. Massey, 269 F.3d 251, 263 (3d Cir. 2001) (internal citation and quotation 
marks omitted).  Actions like lateral transfers or changes of title generally have not been 
found to constitute adverse employment actions in the absence of evidence that there has 
been a material change in an employee’s working conditions.  See Galabya v. N.Y. City 
Bd. of Educ., 202 F.3d 636, 641 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that there had not been an 
adverse employment action against a teacher who was reassigned from teaching a special 
education junior high school class to a mainstream high school class where there was no 
evidence that the change could “constitute a setback to the plaintiff’s career”); Flaherty v. 
Gas Research Inst., 31 F.3d 451, 457 (7th Cir. 1994) (finding no adverse employment 
action when an employee was transferred without a change of salary or benefits although 
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his title and supervisor changed because his “perception that a lateral transfer would be 
personally humiliating [was] insufficient, absent other evidence, to establish a materially 
adverse employment action”); Harlston v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 37 F.3d 379, 382 
(8th Cir. 1994) (finding that a plaintiff’s reassignment without “diminution in her title, 
salary, or benefits” did not constitute an adverse employment action although she became 
responsible for “fewer secretarial duties” and new “more stressful” job duties because 
these changes caused “no materially significant disadvantage” to her). 
 Fiorentini maintains that she was reassigned to a less desirable position when she 
was assigned to work with grades three through six rather than grades kindergarten 
through six.  However, the reassignment did not change her title, salary, or benefits.  
Furthermore, there is no evidence beyond Fiorentini’s own subjective testimony that the 
shift in responsibilities changed the nature of her job.  In this regard her subjective belief 
that her reassignment was a “demotion” is insufficient to create a genuine issue of 
material fact on this issue.5  See Mitchell v. Vanderbilt Univ., 389 F.3d 177, 183 (6th Cir. 
                                              
5  Fiorentini relies on her educational expert’s opinion to argue that the reassignment was 
an adverse employment action, but, as the District Court correctly pointed out, even 
though her expert stated that her reassignment “can be interpreted as a demotion” he did 
so without explaining the basis for the interpretation.  We are satisfied that the expert’s 
statement is insufficient to create a genuine question of material fact on this issue.  See 
App. at 11.  She also cites several cases to support her contention with respect to the 
reassignment but they are either irrelevant or not factually analogous to the situation at 
issue here.  See Hampton v. Borough of Tinton Falls Police Dep’t, 98 F.3d 107, 113, 115 
(3d Cir. 1996) (reversing a grant of summary judgment for an employer on a Title VII 
discrimination claim where it was undisputed for the purpose of summary judgment that 
the employee had made out a prima facie case when he was transferred involuntarily after 
being investigated for misconduct and was not transferred back after the investigation 
was dropped); Torre v. Casio, Inc., 42 F.3d 825, 827, 831-32 (3d Cir. 1994) (finding that 
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2004) (“[A] plaintiff’s subjective impression concerning the desirability of one position 
over another generally does not control with respect to the existence of an adverse 
employment action.”).  Thus, the District Court appropriately found that her reassignment 
did not constitute an adverse employment action.   
 2.  Prima Facie Case: Inference of Discrimination 
 The District Court continued its analysis to the fourth step of Fiorentini’s prima 
facie case of discrimination because it was undisputed that her furlough was an adverse 
employment action.  However, the Court held that she was not able to point to any 
evidence giving rise to an inference that she was the victim of unlawful discrimination. 
 Fiorentini primarily relies on what she describes as better treatment of similarly 
situated individuals to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination.  She argues that 
while she was furloughed, younger employees were kept on in newly created positions, a 
difference of treatment that she believes shows that she was furloughed in circumstances 
giving rise to an inference of discrimination. 
 When relying on the treatment of comparator employees to state a prima facie case 
of age discrimination, these employees must be “similarly situated.”  A determination of 
the significance of the treatment of other employees requires a “fact-intensive inquiry” 
conducted “on a case-by-case basis.”  Monaco v. Am. Gen. Assur. Co., 359 F.3d 296, 
305 (3d Cir. 2004).  The District Court explained that although Fiorentini was the only 
literacy coach/reading specialist who was eventually furloughed, she was also the only 
                                                                                                                                                  
a plaintiff stated a prima facie case of discrimination where he was transferred to a “dead-
end position” from which he was fired a month later). 
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literacy coach/reading specialist who did not possess a Pennsylvania teaching 
certification or any classroom teaching experience under that certification.  See App. at 
13.  All instructors who were retained — several of whom were older than Fiorentini — 
possessed this certification and had teaching experience under the certification.6  The 
Court therefore found that Fiorentini could not point to the treatment of other employees 
to support her prima facie case. 
 We hold that the District Court properly evaluated Fiorentini’s potential 
comparators in reaching its conclusion that they were not “similarly situated.”  The 
School District’s newly created positions after its restructuring required the direct 
teaching of students — which Fiorentini was not doing under her reading specialist 
certification.  See App. at 615-17.  There is no other evidence of age discrimination in the 
record; Fiorentini only relies on comparator evidence.  See Appellant’s Br. at 23-28.  
Thus, the Court correctly found that Fiorentini failed to establish a prima facie case of 
age discrimination and summary judgment for the School District was proper.7 
                                              
6  Fiorentini argues that because the School District retained three younger teachers, she 
had “enough” evidence to “complet[e]” a prima facie case.  Appellant’s br. at 24.  She 
also argues that the School District retained another teacher, June Tolomeo — who was a 
year older than Fiorentini — even though Tolomeo had less teaching experience under 
her Pennsylvania teaching certification than the job posting required.  Id.  But Fiorentini 
did not have a Pennsylvania teaching certificate nor any public school teaching 
experience.  Thus, Fiorentini’s unsupported argument that Tolomeo’s retention is 
“evidence [that] the job requirements were flexible enough that [p]laintiff could hold it 
without a certificate” is unavailing. 
 
7  The District Court also extensively addressed Fiorentini’s inability to show that the 
School District’s advance of an allegedly legitimate non-discriminatory reason for her 
furlough was a pretext for age discrimination.  The Court noted that there was no direct 
evidence of age discrimination and there was “no evidence that a younger teacher with 
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B.  FMLA Retaliation 
 To state a prima facie case for FMLA retaliation, a plaintiff must show that: (1) 
she invoked her FMLA rights; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) the 
adverse action was causally related to the plaintiff’s exercise of her FMLA rights.  
Erdman v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 582 F.3d 500, 508-09 (3d Cir. 2009).  FMLA retaliation 
claims are analyzed under the lens of employment discrimination law and claims based 
on circumstantial evidence are evaluated under the burden-shifting framework of 
McDonnell Douglas.  Lichtenstein v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr., 691 F.3d 294, 302 
(3d Cir. 2012). 
Fiorentini argues that the District Court improperly granted summary judgment to 
the School District on her FMLA retaliation claim.  Fiorentini grounds her FMLA 
retaliation claim solely in her reassignment to working with the testing grades during the 
2009-10 school year rather than her furlough while on FMLA leave.  Fiorentini reiterates 
her perspective that her reassignment constituted a demotion and was thus an adverse 
employment action but she does so without citing any record evidence supporting her 
contention. 
Regardless of the other elements of her prima facie case for FMLA retaliation, we 
agree with the District Court that Fiorentini’s reassignment did not constitute an adverse 
                                                                                                                                                  
the same certification and experience was saved from furlough.”  App. at 15.  Thus, the 
Court concluded that there was no evidence that the decision was “motivated by the . . . 
employee’s age.”  Id. at 16.  Inasmuch as we will affirm the Court’s outcome on 
Fiorentini’s failure to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination, we need not 
make an analysis of her claim under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework 




employment action for the reasons stated above.  Without this element of her claim, 
Fiorentini cannot be successful on the claim.  Thus, we will affirm the District Court’s 
order granting summary judgment to the School District on her FMLA retaliation claim. 
C.  ADA 
 Finally, to state a prima facie case for disability discrimination under the ADA and 
the familiar McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, a plaintiff must show that 
she: “(1) has a ‘disability,’ (2) is a ‘qualified individual,’ and (3) has suffered an adverse 
employment action because of that disability.”  Turner v. Hershey Chocolate U.S., 440 
F.3d 604, 611 (3d Cir. 2006).  To show qualifications, “a plaintiff must . . . demonstrate 
that s/he satisfies the requisite skill, experience, education and other job-related 
requirements of the employment position that such individual holds or desires.”  Skerski 
v. Time Warner Cable Co., 257 F.3d 273, 278 (3d Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  To establish causation in a pretext case, a plaintiff must show that 
consideration of a protected characteristic was a “determinative factor” in the plaintiff’s 
adverse employment action.  Watson v. SEPTA, 207 F.3d 207, 215 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 The District Court found that Fiorentini was “disabled” within the meaning of the 
ADA but that she was not “otherwise qualified” for any positions in the School District at 
the time of her furlough because she did not possess a Pennsylvania teaching 
certification.  The Court also noted that Fiorentini had not presented any evidence that 
disability was a “determinative factor” in her eventual furlough.  Inasmuch as we already 
have found that Fiorentini’s reassignment did not constitute an adverse employment 
action in our analysis of her ADEA and FMLA claims, we limit our analysis of her ADA 
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claim to the question of whether she established a prima facie case of disability 
discrimination in the context of her furlough. 
 We agree with the District Court that the undisputed facts show that Fiorentini was 
not qualified for any available positions when she was furloughed after the School 
District’s reorganization because she did not possess a Pennsylvania teaching 
certification or have any of the requisite classroom teaching experience under such a 
certification.8  We also agree with the District Court that Fiorentini did not point to any 
evidence that her disability was connected to, let alone a “determinative factor” in, the 
decision to furlough her.9  In fact, as the Court pointed out, Fiorentini’s union 
representative informed her at least four months before her cancer diagnosis that she was 
                                              
8  Fiorentini’s repeated argument that she was qualified because the School District 
retained a teacher who had a Pennsylvania teaching certificate and some classroom 
teaching experience under that certificate — neither of which Fiorentini had — simply 
does not salvage her claim.  See Appellant’s Br. at 29. 
 
9  As the District Court noted, although there is some conflict in testimony regarding a 
comment Ambrose made to Fiorentini about reassigning her to work with the testing 
grades in the 2009-10 school year “because of her health,” it appears to be undisputed 
that Ambrose was not involved in decision-making about the furlough over a year later, a 
step that was an adverse employment action.  App. at 21 n.5; see Ryder v. Westinghouse 
Elec. Corp., 128 F.3d 128, 133 (3d Cir. 1997) (to determine the weight of an off-hand 
comment, a court must “evaluate factors pertaining to the declarant[,] . . . including the 
declarant’s position in the corporate hierarchy, the purpose and content of the statement, 
and the temporal connection between the statement and the challenged employment 
action”); see also Appellee’s Br. at 28-29 (arguing that any “alleged statement made by 
Ms. Ambrose approximately eighteen months before Ms. Fiorentini was furloughed is 
insufficient evidence to establish pretext given that Ms. Ambrose played absolutely no 
role in the decision to not select Ms. Fiorentini for any positions that became available 




at risk of being furloughed because she lacked a Pennsylvania teaching certification.10  
See App. at 22.  Moreover, the School District began the process of reorganizing months 
prior to Fiorentini’s cancer diagnosis.  We conclude that Fiorentini therefore failed to 
make out a prima facie case of disability discrimination and will affirm the Court’s grant 
of summary judgment for the School District on her ADA claim. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s order of February 





                                              
10  Fiorentini argues that “because there is no record evidence explaining the criteria used 
to select [Fiorentini] for a furlough, a reasonable fact finder could draw an inference of 
discrimination thus determining that [Fiorentini’s] disability was a ‘determinative 
factor.’”  Appellant’s Br. at 30.  However, the record makes clear that all employees in 
Fiorentini’s position initially were slated to be furloughed and that the new position that 
the School District created into which some of those employees transitioned required 
qualifications that Fiorentini did not possess.  Combined with the forewarning Fiorentini 
received from her union representative months before her cancer diagnosis about the 
potential of an upcoming furlough based on the inadequacy of her qualifications, 
Fiorentini’s argument does not allow us to draw an “inference of discrimination.” 
